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Abstract—Fog computing is transforming the network edge
into an intelligent platform by bringing storage, computing,
control, and networking functions closer to end-users, things,
and sensors. How to allocate multiple resource types (e.g., CPU,
memory, bandwidth) of capacity-limited heterogeneous fog nodes
to competing services with diverse requirements and preferences
in a fair and efficient manner is a challenging task. To this end, we
propose a novel market-based resource allocation framework in
which the services act as buyers and fog resources act as divisible
goods in the market. The proposed framework aims to compute a
market equilibrium (ME) solution at which every service obtains
its favorite resource bundle under the budget constraint while
the system achieves high resource utilization. This work extends
the General Equilibrium literature by considering a practical
case of satiated utility functions. Also, we introduce the notions
of non-wastefulness and frugality for equilibrium selection, and
rigorously demonstrate that all the non-wasteful and frugal ME
are the optimal solutions to a convex program. Furthermore,
the proposed equilibrium is shown to possess salient fairness
properties including envy-freeness, sharing-incentive, and propor-
tionality. Another major contribution of this work is to develop a
privacy-preserving distributed algorithm, which is of independent
interest, for computing an ME while allowing market participants
to obfuscate their private information. Finally, extensive perfor-
mance evaluation is conducted to verify our theoretical analyses.
Index Terms—General Equilibrium, multi-resource allocation,
privacy-preserving distributed optimization, fog computing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fog Computing (FC), also known as Edge Computing (EC),
is an emerging paradigm that complements the cloud to enable
a wide range of Internet of Things (IoT) applications, reduce
network traffic, and enhance user experience. By distributing
storage, computing, control, and networking functions closer
to end-users and data sources, FC enjoys many remarkable
capabilities, including local data processing and analytics,
distributed caching, localization, resource pooling and scaling,
enhanced privacy and security, and reliable connectivity [1],
[2]. Additionally, FC is the key to meeting the stringent
requirements of new systems and low-latency applications
such as embedded artificial intelligence, 5G networks, vir-
tual/augmented reality (VR/AR), and tactile Internet.
Despite the tremendous potential, FC is still in its infancy
stage and many challenges remain to be addressed. In this
paper, we focus on the fog resource allocation problem where a
resource pool consisting of multiple Fog Nodes (FN) is shared
among different services. Here, we consider an FN as any edge
node consisting of one or more computing units (e.g., edge
clouds, micro data centers in campus buildings, enterprises,
hospitals, malls, and telecom central offices, servers at base
stations, and idle PCs in research labs) [1]–[3]. Unlike the tra-
ditional cloud with virtually infinite capacity, FNs have limited
computational power. They also come with different sizes and
configurations. Furthermore, in contrast to a small number of
cloud data centers (DC), there are numerous distributed FNs
[3]. Due to the heterogeneity of the FNs in terms of location,
specifications, reliability, and reputation, the services may have
diverse preferences towards them. For example, a service may
prefer an FN with powerful hardware and geographically close
to it.
Therefore, a primary concern is how to efficiently allocate
the limited fog resources to the competing services with
diverse characteristics and preferences, considering the service
priority and fairness. To address this problem, we propose a
new market-based framework whose goal is to harmonize the
interests of different market participants so that every service
is happy with its allotment while the system maintains high
resource utilization. The core idea is to assign different prices
to resources of different FNs. Specifically, under-demanded
resources are priced low while over-demanded resources have
high prices. In our model, each service has a certain budget for
resource procurement, which represents the service’s priority
level and can be interpreted as the market power of the service
[3]. Given the resource prices, each service buys an optimal
resource bundle to maximize its utility under the budget
constraint. When the market clears, the resulting prices and
allocation form a market equilibrium (ME) [4], [5].
The proposed model is motivated by many real-world sce-
narios [3]. For instance, to divide fog resources among multi-
ple network slices [6], a Telco can grant different budgets to
the slices depending on their importance and potential revenue
generation (e.g., the total fee paid by the users of each slice).
Similarly, using virtual budgets, different labs/departments in
a university can fairly share the fog resources located on their
campus. Additionally, a service provider (e.g., Uber, Pokemon
Go, a sensor network), who owns a set of FNs in a city, may
allocate virtual budgets to different groups of users/sensors
based on their populations in different areas. Another example
inspired by the group buying concept is that several companies
(i.e., services) may agree upfront on their individual budgets,
then buy/rent a set of FNs together. Instead, these companies
can pay subscription fees (i.e., budgets) to use fog resources of
a platform that manages a resource pool. This is quite similar
to the current postpaid mobile plan models.
For the settings described above, it is necessary to consider
both system efficiency and fairness. Therefore, traditional
solutions such as welfare maximization, maxmin fairness, and
auction may not be suitable [3]. For instance, a welfare maxi-
mization solution, which is also often the design goal of many
auction models [7], typically allocates most of the resources to
2agents with high marginal gains while giving very little, even
nothing, to agents with low marginal utilities. Thus, it may not
be fair to some agents. On the other hands, a maxmin fairness
allocation often gives too many resources to agents with low
marginal utilities, hence, it may not be efficient. Different from
these approaches, our proposed market-based solution is both
fair and efficient. In particular, we formulate the fog resource
allocation problem as a Fisher market where the services act
as buyers and the fog resources are divisible goods.
Since there are multiple goods and the purchase decision
of each buyer depends on all these goods (both prices and
the buyer’s preferences towards them), the proposed problem
is inherently a General Equilibrium (GE) problem [4]. The
existence of an ME in the GE model was established under
some mild conditions (e.g., locally non-satiated utilities) in the
seminal work of Arrow and Debreu [8]. Unfortunately, their
proof relies on fixed-point theorem and does not give an algo-
rithm to compute an equilibrium [5]. Hence, the algorithmic
aspects of the GE theory have recently drawn a lot of interests
from theoretical computer scientists [9]–[12], [46]. However,
there is still no general technique for equilibrium computation
[11]. The strategic behavior of agents in the Fisher market
game has also been studied extensively recently [47]–[50].
Conventionally, the dual variables associated with the re-
source capacity constraints are often interpreted as the resource
prices [13]. Thus, without budget consideration, popular tech-
niques such as network utility maximization (NUM) [14] can
be employed to compute an ME. However, these techniques
do not work for the Fisher market. The main challenge stems
from the budget constraints and the market clearing condition
that couple the allocation decision (i.e., primal variables) and
the prices (i.e., dual variables). Fortunately, for a wide class
of utility functions, the ME in a Fisher market can be found
by solving an Eisenberg-Gale (EG) program [5], [15].
Unlike the previous works, we focus on a practical setting
where the services have utility limits due to their limited
demands (e.g., the request rate of a service in a given area
is not unlimited). This violates the implicit assumption in the
GE literature that requires the utility function is non-satiated
(i.e., for any bundle of goods, there is always another bundle of
goods that is strictly improve the utility [4]). Also, because of
the limited demand constraint, the services’ utility functions
do not satisfy the conditions of the EG program. Our work
aims to understand the ME concept in this setting.
While an ME solution is highly desirable, multiple equi-
libria may exist. Indeed, when we consider the utility limit,
the allocation at some equilibrium can be wasteful and non-
Pareto efficient as discussed in III-B2. Hence, we impose
additional criteria to select an ME with some good properties.
Specifically, an allocation should be non-wasteful and frugal.
An allocation is non-wasteful if no resources desired by any
service are left unallocated and no service receives resources
that it has no use for [16], [17]. The frugality property implies
that services want to maximize their utilities while spending
less money. Note that the non-wastefulness and frugality
concepts do not exist in the traditional Fisher market. The
proposed framework allows us to compute a non-wasteful and
frugal ME, which implies the allocation is efficient.
We further connect the equilibrium to the fair division
literature [18]. Specifically, the proposed ME is shown to
have appealing fairness properties including envy-freeness,
sharing-incentive, and proportionality [17], [18]. Indeed, these
properties were seldom studied in the ME literature. Note that,
in general, not every ME satisfies these properties. In this
work, we do not pursue strategy-proofness and assume that
the services are price-takers. This assumption is reasonable
in an environment with a large number of agents. Further-
more, we develop a privacy-preserving distributed algorithm
for equilibrium computation, which prevents adversaries from
learning private information (even statistical information) of
the services, hence, alleviates the necessity of the strategy-
proofness requirement. To the best of our knowledge, this is
one of the first parallel and distributed algorithms implemented
in a privacy-preserving manner. This algorithm is quite general
and may find applications in other scenarios as well.
Although this work is closely related to our previous
work [3], there are several fundamental differences. First, [3]
considers the Fisher market with linear utilities and single
resource type. Here, we study more complex utility functions
and multiple resource types. Second, [3] aims to address the
non-uniqueness of optimal bundles in designing distributed
algorithms and equilibrium computation in the net profit
maximization case. On the other hands, the purpose of this
work is to investigate the ME concept in a market with utility
limits. Additionally, in [3], the utility of every service is unique
across all the market equilibria. However, it is not the case
with our model. This work also introduces the new notions of
non-wastefulness and frugality for equilibrium selection. Fur-
thermore, we devise a privacy-preserving distributed algorithm
for computing an ME. Our main contributions include:
• Modeling. We formulate a new multi-resource allocation
(MRA) problem in FC with budget-constrained agents.
The problem is cast as a Fisher market and we advocate
the GE. We are among the first explicitly tackle the MRA
problem in the general setting with multiple nodes, each
has multiple resource types, and multiple agents with
finite demands [17].
• Centralized solution. We theoretically extend the GE lit-
erature to consider the practical case where services have
utility limits. We show that all non-wasteful and frugal
market equilibria can be captured by a convex program.
Furthermore, the proposed equilibrium is proved to have
remarkable fairness properties.
• Decentralized algorithms. By blending the alternating
direction method of multipliers (ADMM) method with
auxiliary variables and an efficient privacy-preserving
averaging technique, we derive a parallel and distributed
algorithm that converges to a non-wasteful and frugal ME
while preserving the services’ privacy.
• Performance Evaluation. Extensive simulations are con-
ducted to confirm our theoretical results and demonstrate
the efficacy of the proposed techniques.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system
model and problem formulation are given in Section II. Section
III presents centralized solutions for computing an ME and
analyzes the properties of the ME. The privacy-preserving
distributed algorithm for computing the ME is introduced in
Section IV. Finally, simulation results are shown in Section V
3followed by the discussion of related work in Section VI, and
conclusions and future work in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
Fig. 1: System model
With FC, besides local execution and remote processing
at cloud DCs, requests and data from end-devices (e.g.,
smartphones, PCs, sensors) can be handled by a fog network.
Typically, a request first goes to a Point of Aggregation (e.g.,
switches/routers, base stations, access points), then it will
be routed to an FN for processing. In practice, enterprises,
factories, organizations (e.g., malls, schools, hospitals), and
other third parties (e.g., sensor network owners) can out-
source their services and computation to a fog network. Also,
content/application/service providers (e.g., Google, Netflix,
Uber, AR companies) can proactively place their data and
applications onto FNs to serve better their customers.
In this work, we consider a system that consists of multi-
ple services and a set of resource-constrained heterogeneous
FNs. The system size may correspond to a metropolitan
area network. Each service has a certain budget for resource
procurement and wants to offload as many requests as possible
to the fog network. The services are assumed to be price-
takers, which is reasonable for a large market with multiple
services. Each FN provides multiple resource types such as
CPU, memory, and bandwidth (BW). We assume that there
is a platform lying between the services and the FNs (i.e.,
the fog resource pool). Based on the information collected
from the FNs (e.g., capacities) and the services (e.g., budget,
preference, demand), the platform computes an ME solution
that assigns a price to every fog resource and allocates an
optimal resource bundle to every service. Each service can
obtain information about the prices and its allocated resources
from the platform. Also, the platform may control and manage
the resource pool to implement the allocation decision. Fig. 1
presents the system model.
We assume that the requests (e.g., Apple Siri, Google Voice
Search, weather/maps queries, AR, IoT data collection) are
independent and each request requires resources in a specific
ratio [17], [19]–[22]. The amount of resources at an FN needed
to handle a request of a service is called the base demand of
that service at the FN. For example, if a request of service A
needs 0.2 units of CPU and 0.1 units of RAM at FN B, its base
demand vector at FN B is (CPU: 0.2, RAM: 0.1). The number
of requests of a service can be served is proportional to the
amount of resources allocated to it. For instance, if service A
receives 0.4 units of CPU and 0.3 units of RAM from FN B,
it can process two requests (i.e., min{ 0.40.2 , 0.30.1}). Our model
allows a service to specify different base demand vectors at
different FNs to express its diverse preferences towards the
fog resources.
B. Service Utility Model
We denote the sets of FNs and services by M and N ,
respectively. The corresponding numbers of FNs and services
areM and N . Let R = {1, 2, . . . , R} be the set of R different
types of resources. Define i, j, and r as the service index,
FN index, and resource type. The capacity of resource type
r at FN j is Cj,r. The base demand vector of service i for
resources of FN j is Dji =
(
ai,j,1, . . . , ai,j,R
)
where ai,j,r is
the amount of resource type r at FN j required to process
one request of service i. For simplicity in presentation, we
assume that ai,j,r > 0, ∀i, j, r. Note that all results in this
paper still hold if ai,j,r = 0, for some i, j, r. Due to different
hardware specifications and locations of the FNs, the base
demand vectors of a service at different FNs can be different.
For example, a service may set higher values for bandwidth
and computing resources in its base demand vector at an FN
far away from it to ensure low latency.
Define xi,j,r as the amount of resource type r at FN j
allocated to service i and xi,j =
(
xi,j,1, . . . , xi,j,R
)
as the
vector of resources allocated to service i from FN j. The
resource bundle that service i receives from the FNs is
xi =
(
xi,1, xi,2, . . . , xi,M
) ∈ RMxR. Each bundle xi is a
matrix where each row represents resources of an FN and each
column represents a resource type. As explained in the system
model, given xi,j , the number of requests yi,j of service i that
can be processed by FN j is [19]–[22]
yi,j(xi,j) = min
{xi,j,1
ai,j,1
, . . . ,
xi,j,R
ai,j,R
}
= min
r
xi,j,r
ai,j,r
, ∀i, j. (1)
Thus, given resource bundle xi, the total number of requests
yi that the fog network can process for service i is
yi(xi) =
∑
j
yi,j(xi,j) =
∑
j
min
r
xi,j,r
ai,j,r
, ∀i. (2)
In practice, a service may not have infinite demand (i.e.,
number of requests over a certain period). Let Di be the
maximum demand of service i. Then, the actual number of
requests yi(xi) of service i processed by the FNs is
yi(xi) = min
{∑
j
min
r
xi,j,r
ai,j,r
, Di
}
, ∀i. (3)
The utility function of a service maps each resource bundle
to a number quantifying the service’s valuation for that bundle.
Define the utility function of service i as ui(xi) : R
MxR → R.
Let ei be the gain of service i for each request processed by
the fog network. We have:
ui(xi) = ei yi(xi) = min
{
ei
∑
j
min
r
xi,j,r
ai,j,r
, eiDi
}
, ∀i. (4)
4Without loss of generality, we assume ei = 1, ∀i. As can be
seen later, the proposed allocation scheme is scale-free and
independent of ei. Then, we have:
ui(xi) = min
{∑
j
min
r
xi,j,r
ai,j,r
, Di
}
,
= min
{∑
j
ui,j(xi,j), u
max
i
}
, ∀i, (5)
where umaxi = Di and ui,j(xi,j) = minr
xi,j,r
ai,j,r
. We call umaxi
the utility limit of service i.
Note that a service i may want to be served by only a subset
of FNs Ai ∈ M that satisfy certain criteria (e.g., in terms
of hardware specifications, reliability, and communication dis-
tance). For instance, a latency-sensitive service may be inter-
ested in only FNs that are geographically close to it. In this
case, we have ui(xi) = min
{∑
j∈Ai
ui,j(xi,j), u
max
i
}
, ∀i
and xi,j,r = 0, ∀r, j ∈ M/Ai. For simplicity of notations,
we do not consider this constraint and assume Ai = M, ∀i.
Indeed, the subsequent analysis and solution approaches re-
main unchanged if we consider this constraint.
C. Fog Computing Resource Allocation Problem
We cast the problem as a Fisher market where the services
act as buyers1 and the fog resources act as divisible goods. The
market aims to price and allocate the resources to the services
effectively. Denote by pj =
(
pj,1, pj,2, . . . , pj,R
)
the price
vector of resources of FN j where pj,r is the price of of one
unit of resource type r at FN j. Let p =
(
p1, p2, . . . , pM
) ∈
R
MxR capture the resource prices of all the FNs. Define Bi as
the budget of service i. The optimal (i.e., utility-maximizing)
resource bundle of service i at prices p can be found by solving
the following service utility maximization problem.
maximize
xi
ui(xi) (6)
subject to
∑
j
∑
r
xi,j,rpj,r ≤ Bi (7)
xi,j,r ≥ 0, ∀j, r, (8)
where (7) captures the budget limit of service i. Note that
each service computes its optimal resource bundle based
simply on the resource prices and it does not care about the
resource capacity constraints of the FNs. From the definition
of the service utility function given in (5), we can rewrite the
optimization problem (6)-(8) of each service i as follows.
maximize
xi, ui
ui (9)
subject to ui = min
{∑
j
ui,j, u
max
i
}
(10)
ui,j = min
r
xi,j,r
ai,j,r
, ∀j (11)∑
j
∑
r
xi,j,rpj,r ≤ Bi (12)
xi,j,r ≥ 0, ∀j, r. (13)
Problem Statement: The proposed scheme aims to find
an ME solution (p∗, X∗) consisting of equilibrium prices
1The words ”service” and ”buyer” are used interchangeably in this paper.
p∗ =
(
p∗1, p
∗
2, . . . , p
∗
M
)
and equilibrium allocation X∗ =(
x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
N
)
. At the equilibrium, every service receives
its optimal resource bundle. In other words, x∗i is a utility-
maximizing resource bundle of service i at the equilibrium
prices p∗. Additionally, we would like to achieve high utiliza-
tion of the available fog resources. The definition of an ME
is formally given as follows [5].
Definition 2.1: (p∗,X∗) is an ME if the two following
conditions hold [5].
• Service Satisfaction Condition: Given a non-negative
price vector p∗, every service receives its favorite resource
bundle x∗i that maximizes its utility under the budget
constraint. In other words, x∗i is an optimal solution to
the problem (6)-(8) with p = p∗, i.e., we have:
∀i : x∗i ∈ argmax
xi≥0;
∑
j
∑
r
p∗
j,r
xi,j,r≤Bi
ui(xi). (14)
• Market-Clearing Condition: Every fog resource is ei-
ther fully allocated or has zero price, i.e., we have:
(
∑
i x
∗
i,j,r − Cj,r) p∗j,r = 0, ∀j, r.
These two conditions ensure that the equilibrium allocation
maximizes the happiness of every service while maintain-
ing high resource utilization. The second condition presents
Walras’ law [4], [5] which states that all fog resources with
positive prices (p∗j,r > 0) are fully allocated (
∑
i x
∗
i,j,r = Cj,r)
and the remaining resources (i.e., not fully allocated) have
zero prices. Indeed, due to zero prices, these resources can
be allocated arbitrarily to the services without violating the
budget constraints. Also, this additional allocation does not
strictly improve the utility of any service since x∗i is already
a utility-maximizing resource bundle of service i among all
its affordable bundles (i.e., following the service satisfaction
condition). Hence, we can understand that the market clears.
In our problem, the services are players competing for the
limited fog resources, while the platform tries to satisfy the
market clearing condition. Prices are used to coordinate the
market. Without loss of generality, we normalize the resource
capacities of the FNs, i.e., we have:
Cj,r = 1, ∀j, r. (15)
The prices and the base demand vectors of the services can
be scaled accordingly. This normalization is just to follow the
standard market equilibrium literature [5], [9], and to simplify
expressions and equations in the paper.
It is worth emphasizing that (6)-(8) or equivalently (9)–(13)
is the optimization problem of individual services while the
market/platform (not the services) needs to ensure the global
constraints including the market-clearing condition and the
resource capacity constraints as follows:(∑
i
x∗i,j,r − 1
)
p∗j,r = 0, ∀j, r (16)∑
i
x∗i,j,r ≤ 1, ∀j, r. (17)
Our design goal is to find an ME (p∗, X∗) that simultaneously
maximizes the utility of every service (i.e., x∗i is an optimal
solution of (6)-(8) with p = p∗, ∀i) while satisfying the global
constraints (16)-(17).
5III. CENTRALIZED SOLUTION APPROACH
This section presents centralized solutions for computing
market equilibria of the proposed problem. First, we briefly
introduce the Fisher market and the Eisenberg–Gale (EG)
program for computing ME when the services’ utility func-
tions are concave and homogeneous of degree one2 [4], [5].
However, due to the finite demands of the services, their
utilities are not homogeneous. We show that the optimal
solution of the EG program for services with infinite demands
is still an ME of our model for services with finite demands.
However, this equilibrium allocation can be wasteful. Then,
we rigorously demonstrate that all the non-wasteful and frugal
market equilibria of our model can be captured by a convex
program which is a natural generalization of the EG program.
Furthermore, we show compelling fairness features of the ME
solution obtained from this convex program.
A. The Eisenberg-Gale Program
Consider a Fisher market with N buyers and K divisible
goods with unit capacities. Let i and k be the buyer index
and goods index. Buyer i is characterized by budget Bi and
a utility function Ui(xi) where xi = (xi,1, . . . , xi,K) is the
vector of resources allocated to buyer i. If the buyers’ utility
functions are all concave and homogeneous of degree one, the
optimal solution of the following EG program is an exact ME
of this Fisher market [5], [15].
maximize
X
∑
i
Bi ln Ui(xi) (18)
subject to
∑
i
xi,k ≤ 1, ∀k (19)
xi,k ≥ 0, ∀i, k. (20)
Specifically, let (p∗, X∗) be an optimal solution of the EG
program (18)-(20) where p∗ is the dual variables associated
with constraint (19). Then, for every buyer i, x∗i maximizes
Ui(xi) under the budget constraint
∑
k xi,k p
∗
k ≤ Bi and
xi,k ≥ 0, ∀k. Furthermore, the market-clearing condition is
satisfied, i.e.,
(∑
i x
∗
i,k − 1
)
p∗k = 0, ∀k.
Many well-known functions, such as linear, Cobb-Douglas,
and Leontief, satisfy both concavity and homogeneity of
degree one [5]. A function u(x) is linear if u(x) =
∑
k akxk.
A Cobb-Douglas function has the form u(x) =
∏
k x
ak
k
where
∑
k ak = 1. Finally, a Leontief function has the form
u(x) = mink(xk/ak). Another popular class of homogeneous
utility functions is the Constant Elasticity of Substitution
(CES) function [4], [5].
B. Centralized Solution
We now return to our resource allocation problem. It can
be observed that the service utility function in (5) is a
combination of linear and Leontief functions (i.e., sum of
Leontief functions ui,j(xi,j)). Additionally, the utility limit
makes this function more complex.
2A function f(x) is homogeneous of degree d if f(αx) =
αdf(x), for all α > 0.
1) Services with Infinite Demands: First, we consider the
case in which services have unlimited demands. Then, from
(5), the utility of service i becomes
ui(xi) = u
inf
i (xi) =
∑
j
ui,j(xi,j) =
∑
j
min
r
xi,j,r
ai,j,r
, ∀i. (21)
Proposition 3.1: If a service has infinite demand, its utility
function is concave and homogeneous of degree one.
Proof. Please refer to Appendix A. 
Thus, we can directly apply the EG program (18)-(20),
where goods k corresponds to resource type r of FN j and
each service is a buyer, and have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2: If all the services have infinite demands, the
optimal solution of the following problem
maximize
X
∑
i
Bi ln
(∑
j
min
r
xi,j,r
ai,j,r
)
(22)
subject to
∑
i
xi,j,r ≤ 1, ∀j, r (23)
xi,j,r ≥ 0, ∀i, j, r. (24)
is an exact ME of our fog resource allocation problem.
2) Services with Finite Demands: When the services have
limited demands, which is often the case in practice, it is easy
to see that the utility function in (5) is not homogeneous.
For example, when a service reaches its utility limit, its
utility remains unchanged when we double the amount of
resources allocated to it. We show that the optimal solution
to (22)-(24) is still an ME of the proposed resource allocation
model where services have finite demands (i.e., utility limits).
However, this solution may lead to a wasteful allocation
because some services may receive too many resources at the
equilibrium without improving their utilities. An allocation is
non-wasteful if: i) the remaining resources after the allocation
cannot improve the utility of any service; ii) no service
receives more resources than its need [16], [17].
Proposition 3.3: The optimal solution to the problem (22)-
(24) (i.e., without considering utility limit) is an ME of the
proposed resource allocation problem for services with finite
demands. However, this solution may lead to a wasteful and
non-Pareto optimal allocation.
Proof. Let (p∗, X∗) be an optimal solution to (22)-(24) and
p∗j,r is the dual variable associated with the capacity constraint
(23). From Corollary 3.2, (p∗, X∗) is an ME of our model for
services with infinite demands. We will show (p∗, X∗) is also
an ME of our model for services with finite demands.
According to Definition 2.1, at prices p∗, x∗i maximizes∑
j minr
xi,j,r
ai,j,r
, ∀i, under the service’s budget constraint. For
services with utility limits (i.e., finite demands), since x∗i
maximizes
∑
j minr
xi,j,r
ai,j,r
at prices p∗, x∗i also maximizes
min
{∑
j minr
xi,j,r
ai,j,r
, umaxi
}
at p∗ while respecting the budget
constraint. Additionally, (p∗, X∗) still satisfies the market
clearing condition. Therefore, (p∗, X∗) is an exact ME of the
proposed problem for services with finite demands.
However, X∗ can be a wasteful allocation since some
services with limited utilities may get redundant resources at
the equilibrium (i.e.,
∑
j minr
x∗i,j,r
ai,j,r
> umaxi ). These resources
can be reallocated to other services that have not reached
utility limit to improve their utilities. Thus, X∗ may not be
6Pareto-optimal since some service can get strictly better utility
without affecting the utility of other services. This issue is
illustrated in the simulation (e.g., see Fig. 2). 
In addition to the result presented in Fig. 2 in the simulation,
interested readers can refer to Appendix F and Appendix G
for some toy examples of the wasteful equilibrium allocation
phenomenon. Since multiple market equilibria can exist, we
need to impose some criteria to select a good ME. First, we
are interested in finding a non-wasteful ME, which implies
the equilibrium allocation is efficient. Assume X∗ is a non-
wasteful allocation and (p∗, X∗) is a non-wasteful ME. The
market clearing condition of an ME ensures that no resources
desired by any service are left unallocated. Specifically, re-
sources that are not fully allocated have zero prices. As
explained in the paragraph following the Definition 2.1, these
resources can be given to any service without increasing
the utility of the service. Thus, an ME always satisfies the
first requirement of a non-wasteful allocation (defined before
Proposition 3.3). To satisfy the second requirement that no
service receives resources that it has no use for, i.e., we need:
∑
j
min
r
x∗i,j,r
ai,j,r
≤ umaxi , ∀i. (25)
Additionally, resources allocated to a service from an FN
must be proportional to the service’s base demand vector (i.e.,
x∗i,j,r = β ai,j,r for all i, j, r and some constant β).
The second criterion is frugality. It is natural to assume that
the services want to maximize their utilities while spending as
least money as possible. Hence, a service would prefer an FN
with the cheapest price for its base demand vector. Let p be
the resource prices. The price for the base demand vector Dji
of service i at FN j is
qi,j =
∑
r
pj,rai,j,r, ∀i, j. (26)
Define qmini = minj qi,j , ∀i. The frugality property states that
service i will buy resources only from the set of FNs j such
that qi,j = q
min
i . We also define αi =
1
qmin
i
as maximum bang-
per-buck (MBB) of service i, which generalizes the notion of
MBB for linear utility in [9].
Before presenting our main result, it is necessary to un-
derstand the buying strategy (i.e., action) of the services at
a non-wasteful and frugal ME (p∗, X∗). Consider service i.
To maximize its utility as well as to satisfy the frugality
condition, service i will buy resources from the cheapest FNs
only (i.e., the FNs offer it MBB). In other words, service
i buys resources only from the set of FNs j′ such that
qi,j′ = q
min
i = minj
∑
r p
∗
j,rai,j,r. Furthermore, service i
either spends full budget to buy resources from the cheapest
FNs or spends money until reaching its utility limit. Intuitively,
this buying strategy maximizes the utility of the service and
satisfies the frugality condition.
Our main finding is that the following optimization problem,
which is a natural extension of the EG program, allows us to
find a non-wasteful and frugal ME.
maximize
X,u
∑
i
Bi ln
∑
j
ui,j (27)
subject to ui,jai,j,r = xi,j,r , ∀i, j, r (28)∑
j
ui,j ≤ umaxi , ∀i (29)
∑
i
xi,j,r ≤ 1, ∀j, r (30)
xi,j,r ≥ 0, ∀i, j, r. (31)
While the idea of adding utility limit constraints is natural,
the following theorem and its proof are not trivial since the
existing results on ME in the Fisher market (and the GE theory
in general) rely heavily on the critical assumptions of non-
satiated utility functions [5], [15], which is not the case in
our model. Furthermore, the non-wastefulness and frugality
notions do not exist in the traditional Fisher model. Theorem
3.4 includes two main parts. The first part states that the
optimal solutions to the problem (27)-(31) are non-wasteful
and frugal market equilibria of our problem.More importantly,
the second part states that the set of all the non-wasteful and
frugal market equilibria are exactly the set of optimal solutions
to the problem (27)-(31).
Based on the analysis of the optimal buying strategy of
the services, to prove the first part, we need to show: i)
the optimal solutions to (27)-(31) satisfy the market-clearing
condition in Definition 2.1; ii) the services buy resources from
the cheapest FNs only (i.e., FNs offer them MBB); iii) every
service either reaches its utility limit or spends full budget.
Note that constraints (28)-(29) imply that any optimal solution
X∗ to this problem is a non-wasteful allocation. To prove the
second part of the theorem, we need to show that from the
conditions of an ME, non-wastefulness, and frugality, we can
reconstruct the problem (27)-(31).
Theorem 3.4: The optimal solutions to the problem (27)-(31)
are exactly non-wasteful and frugal market equilibria. At the
equilibra, every service either spends all budget or attains its
utility limit. The ME always exists and the utilities are unique
across all such equilibria. Finally, all non-wasteful and frugal
market equilibria are captured by the problem (27)-(31).
Proof. Please refer to Appendix B.
To understand the importance and impact of non-
wastefulness and frugality as well as utility limit, we have
several remarks as follows.
Remark 1: we again emphasize that from Proposition 3.3,
it seems to be natural to add the utility limit constraint to
achieve non-wasteful ME. Hence, one may think that “every
non-wasteful ME is an optimal solution to the problem (27)-
(31).” However, this statement may not hold. A non-wasteful
ME may not necessarily be a solution to (27)-(31). In other
words, this convex program may not necessarily capture the set
of all non-wasteful market equilibria. Indeed, you can observe
that the proof of Theorem 3.4 relies heavily on the frugality
property.
Remark 2: For a system with one FN only (i.e., buyers
with Leontief utility functions), we may not need the frugality
criteria since a buyer has only one node to buy resources (i.e.,
goods) from. The non-wasteful properties may be sufficient
since it enforces every buyer to either fully exhaust his budget
7or reach his utility limit. However, when there are multiple
FNs (i.e., the hybrid linear-Leontief utility function in our
model), at the equilibrium prices (or any price vector), a buyer
who can reach his utility limit may have multiple options to
buy resources. Note that in the Fisher market, money has
no intrinsic value to the buyers. Hence, he may not need
to buy resources from the cheapest FNs to obtain his utility
limit. Therefore, frugality is important for our result. Note
that if a buyer does not fully spend his budget, the surplus
budget can be accumulated/redistributed into later time slots
to give more priority to him in the later slots. The detailed
policy and implementation are flexible and not the focus of
this work. Our work focuses on one time slot only when the
system parameters (e.g., budget, limit, preferences, capacities)
are given.
Remark 3: Without utility limit, obviously, every buyer will
spend full budget to buy more resources to improve his utility.
Consequently, every ME is non-wasteful. However, it is not
true when we consider utility limit. As shown in the theorem
above, some buyers do not fully exhaust their budgets at the
equilibrium.
Remark 4: As shown in Proposition 3.1., without utility
limit, every ME is an optimal solution to the EG program [5].
Furthermore, the utilities of each buyer at such equilibria are
unique [5]. However, when we consider utility limit, there can
exist multiple market equilibria. The utilities of each buyer
at the equilibria may not be unique (e.g., wasteful ME in
Proposition 3.3 and non-wasteful ME in Theorem 3.4). It is
also worth noting that there can be other market equilibria
which are not the optimal solutions to either the problem (22)-
(24) or the problem (27)-(31).
Based on the proof above, we can further show that the
market equilibria obtained from (27)-(31) are Pareto-optimal.
An allocation is Pareto-optimal if there is no other allocation
that would make some service better off without making
some other service worse off [4], which means there is no
strictly “better” allocation. It is worth noting that the famous
first fundamental theorem of welfare economics [4], [8] states
that under some mild conditions, an ME is always Pareto-
optimal. However, its proof relies on the crucial assumption
of locally non-satiated utility functions (e.g., see Proposition
16.C.1 in [4]). Without considering the utility limit, the service
utilities become locally non-satiated, hence, every ME is
Pareto-efficient. However, due to the utility limit, the utility
functions in our problem are locally satiated. Hence, not every
equilibrium allocation in our model is Pareto-optimal (e.g., the
equilibria mentioned in Proposition 3.3. Therefore, our result
on Pareto-optimality is interesting since the utility functions
in our problem are locally satiated due to the utility limit.
Lemma 3.5: The market equilibria obtained from the prob-
lem (27)-(31) are Pareto-optimal.
Proof. We show this by contradiction. Let (p∗, X∗) be an
optimal solution to (27)-(31). Assume X ′ is a strictly better
allocation than X∗. Hence, ui(x
′
i) ≥ ui(x∗i ), ∀i and strict
inequality holds for some i. Let h be the index of the service
that has strictly better utility at X ′. Obviously, if service h
reaches its utility limit at X∗, it cannot strictly increase its
utility. Hence, at X∗, service h has not reached its utility limit.
Thus, from the results of Theorem 3.4, service h spends full
budget at X∗. Furthermore, we proved that every service buys
resources only from cheapest FNs. Hence, at prices p∗, service
h cannot improve its utility and X∗ is Pareto-optimal. 
In summary, a non-wasteful and frugal ME (p∗, X∗) is
an optimal solution to (27)-(31). Since this is a convex
optimization problem, efficient techniques such as the interior-
point method can be used to solve it effectively [13], [51].
The computational aspect of this convex program is further
discussed in Appendix E.
C. Fairness Properties of the ME
In this section, we show that the proposed ME, which is
an optimal solution to (27)-(31), possesses appealing fairness
properties that encourage the services to participate in the
proposed scheme. An allocation is envy-free if no service
envies with the allocation of any other service (i.e., if every
service weakly prefers its allocation to the allocation of any
other service). In other words, every service is happy with its
allocation and does not want to swap its allocation with that
of another service. When the budgets are equal, an envy-free
allocation X implies ui(xi) ≥ ui(xi′ ), ∀i, i′ ∈ N [18]. It
is well-known that every competitive equilibrium from equal
income (CEEI) is envy-free [52]. For the Fisher market, equal
income means the buyers have equal budgets. If the budgets
are not equal, it is easy to see that a market equilibrium can be
not envy-free (e.g., two agents with the same utility function
and one good, the agent with lower budget may envy with
the allocation of the agent with higher budget). It is because
different budgets results in different sets of affordable resource
bundles of different agents at the equilibrium prices. Since the
services may have different budgets, we need to extend the
classical definition of envy-freeness. An allocation X is envy-
free if ui(xi) ≥ ui(BiB′
i
xi′ ), ∀i, i′ ∈ N .
Sharing-incentive is another popular fairness criterion. An
allocation satisfies this property if it gives every service a
better utility than its utility in the proportional sharing scheme.
Proportional sharing is an intuitive way to share resources
fairly (in terms of resource quantity), which allocates every
resource to the services proportional to their budgets. Let xˆ
be the allocation in which every service receives resources
from the FNs proportional to its budget, i.e., xˆi,j,r =
Bi∑
′
i
Bi′
,
∀i, j. Indeed, xˆ can be interpreted as a resource-fair allocation.
The sharing-incentive property implies ui(xi) ≥ ui(xˆi), ∀i.
Additionally, in the fog federation setting where each service
i contributes a portion xˆi,j,r of every resource to FN j in a
resource pool that consists of all the FNs, sharing-incentive
ensures that every service prefers the equilibrium allocation
to its initial resources contributed to the pool. This property
can be interpreted as resource-fairness.
Finally, proportionality is a well-known fairness notion in
Economics [18]. Let C ∈ RMxR be the set of all the fog re-
sources. Obviously, ui(C) is the maximum utility that service i
can achieve by being allocated all the available resources (i.e.,
Cj,r = 1, ∀j, r). It is natural for service i to expect to obtain
a utility of at least Bi∑
i′
Bi′
ui(C). The proportionality property
guarantees that the utility of every service at the equilibrium is
at least proportional to its budget. In other words, an allocation
X satisfies proportionality if ui(xi) ≥ Bi∑
i′
Bi′
ui(C), ∀i.
8Thus, this property can be interpreted as the utility-fairness
(i.e., every service feels fair in terms of the achieved utility).
Theorem 3.6: The proposed ME is envy-free, and satisfies
the sharing-incentive and proportionality properties.
Proof. Please refer to Appendix C. 
IV. DECENTRALIZED SOLUTION
In this section, we develop a privacy-preserving distributed
algorithm for computing a non-wasteful and frugal ME that is
an optimal solution to the problem (27)-(31). The developed
algorithm converges to the ME while preserving the services’
privacy. Specifically, no service needs to reveal any private
information to other parties including the other services and
the platform, which would significantly mitigate the strategic
behavior of the market participants. For example, if a service
can learn private information of some other services, it may be
able to guess the utility functions of these services and submit
strategic bids to the platform to gain benefits. Our scheme
prevents this issue. The proposed scheme is also robust to
common attacks such as collusion and eavesdropping.
We assume that all the services are semi-honest, often
called honest-but-curious, which is a common security model
in security, privacy, and cryptography research [23], [24]. In
the honest-but-curious setting, all parties follow the protocol
(i.e., the distributed algorithm) honestly, but they are still
curious about the information of other parties. To achieve the
design goal of the privacy-preserving distributed algorithm,
we first convert (27)-(31) to a standard ADMM form such
that the distributed algorithm can be conducted in parallel by
the services. This algorithm requires only the average of the
optimal demand vectors of the services at each iteration. Thus,
our task is to derive an effective procedure for calculating the
exact average vector in a privacy-preserving manner.
It is worth noting that if there is only one FN (i.e., a small
DC), the ME can be found in a distributed manner using the
dual decomposition method [13]. Since the objective function
in the problem (27)-(31) is not strictly concave in ui, we
leverage the ADMM technique, which works for non-strictly
convex functions. Due to space limitation, here we do not
study the single FN case.
First, we rewrite the problem (27)-(31) as follows:
maximize
X
∑
i
Bi ln
∑
j
xi,j,1
ai,j,1
(32)
subject to
∑
j
xi,j,1
ai,j,1
≤ umaxi , ∀i
∑
i
xi,j,r ≤ 1, ∀j, r; xi,j,r ≥ 0, ∀i, j, r.
The traditional ADMM approach [25] cannot be directly ap-
plied to tackle this problem since it can only solve optimization
problems without inequality constraints. More importantly, the
problem (32) has multi-block variables (i.e., xi’s) while the
traditional ADMM approach can only solve problems with
two blocks of variables. An intuitive solution is to extend
the traditional ADMM to multi-block variables and update
xi sequentially. However, such Gauss-Seidel ADMM may not
converge for N ≥ 3 [26]. Furthermore, in the traditional
ADMM, the blocks are updated one after another, hence, it
is not amenable for parallelization. Another solution is to
convert the multi-block problem into an equivalent two-block
problem via variable splitting [25]. However, this method
substantially increases the number of variables and constraints
in the problem, especially when N is large. In [27], the
authors propose the Jacobi-Proximal ADMM approach, which
is suitable for parallel and distributed optimization, by adding
additional proximal terms to the variable-update step. Our
approach does not utilize proximal terms. Finally, the existing
approaches require the agents to share their private information
with each other in every iteration. Thus, they are not suitable
for our design goal.
To make use of ADMM, we first clone all variables xi’s
using auxiliary variables zi = (zi,1, . . . , zi,M ) and obtain the
following problem that is equivalent to the problem (32).
maximize
x, z
∑
i
Bi ln
∑
j
xi,j,1
ai,j,1
(33)
subject to xi,j,r − zi,j,r = 0, ∀i, j, r∑
j
xi,j,1
ai,j,1
≤ umaxi , ∀i
∑
i
zi,j,r ≤ 1, ∀j, r
xi,j,r ≥ 0, ∀i, j, r.
To convert this problem into ADMM form, we define:
fi(xi) := vi(xi) + hi(xi), ∀i
vi(xi) := −Bi ln
∑
j
xi,j,1
ai,j,1
, ∀i
hi(xi) :=
{
0 if xi ∈ Xi
+∞ otherwise
g(
∑
i
zi) :=
{
0 if z ∈ Z
+∞ otherwise
Xi :=
{
xi
∣∣ ∑
j
xi,j,1
ai,j,1
≤ umaxi , ∀i;
xi,j,r ≥ 0, ∀i, j, r
}
Z :=
{
z
∣∣ ∑
i
zi,j,r ≤ 1, ∀j, r
}
,
where hi(.) and g(.) are indicator functions. Then, the problem
(33) can be written in ADMM form as follows:
minimize
x,z
∑
i
fi(xi) + g(
∑
i
zi) (34)
subject to xi,j,r − zi,j,r = 0, ∀i, j, r,
with variables xi, zi ∈ RMxR, ∀i. To simplify the notation,
we consider each resource type r at FN j as an item k and
we have a total of K = M x R items. Then, xi, zi ∈ RK , ∀i,
and the problem (34) can be expressed as below.
minimize
x, z
∑
i
fi(xi) + g(
∑
i
zi) (35)
subject to xi − zi = 0, ∀i. (36)
We have eliminated the coupling constraints between vari-
ables xi’s. Furthermore, the variables now can be divided into
9two blocks (i.e., one contains all xi’s, and the other contains
all zi’s). Hence, we are ready to use the ADMM approach to
construct a parallel and distributed algorithm for computing
the ME. First, define x, z ∈ RK as follows
x =
1
N
∑
i
xi; z =
1
N
∑
i
zi. (37)
Also, let pi =
(
pi,1, pi,2, . . . , pi,K
) ∈ RK , ∀i, be the
dual variables associated with constraint (36). Indeed, we can
show that pi = p, ∀i (see Appendix D). The ADMM-based
decentralized implementation is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Due to the space limitation, we do not present the construction
of this algorithm. Please refer to Appendix D for the detailed
derivation.
In this algorithm, rprimal,t+1 and rdual,t+1 are the primal
and dual residuals at iteration t + 1, respectively. As defined
in [25], we have ||rprimal,t+1||2 =
√
N ||zt+1 − xt+1||2 and
||rdual,t+1||2 = ρ ||zt+1 − zt||2. At each iteration t, given z
and price signal p, each service i solves a convex optimization
problem to find its optimal resource bundle xt+1i and sends
it to the platform. After collecting the optimal demands of
all the services, the platform updates zt+1 by solving (38).
Based on the updated values of x and z, the resource prices
can be updated by the platform or the FNs. The algorithm
terminates when the primal and dual residuals are sufficiently
small [25] or the number of iterations becomes sufficiently
large. Otherwise, the new values of x, z, and p are sent to every
service. The steps described above repeat until the algorithm
converges. The convergence properties of Algorithm 1 follows
directly the standard ADMM method [25].
Remark: It is worth noting that the z-update and dual-update
steps can be carried out by every service and the services
only need to exchange messages to update x. By this way, the
algorithm can be implemented in a fully distributed manner
by the services (i.e., without the platform).
Algorithm 1 DISTRIBUTED IMPLEMENTATION
1: Initialization: set {x1i }, {z
1
k
}, {p1
k
}, ρ, γ1, γ2, t = 0.
2: repeat
3: At iteration t := t + 1, do:
4: x-update: each service i solves the following sub-problem to compute
xt+1i
min
xi
vi(xi) +
ρ
2
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣xi − xti + x
t − zt + 1
ρ
pt
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
2
2
, s.t., xi ∈ Xi.
5: z-update: to compute zt+1, the platform solves
min
z
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣z − xt+1 −
1
ρ
pt
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
2
s.t., N z ∈ Z. (38)
6: Dual update: the platform or FNs updates pt+1
pt+1
k
:= pt
k
+ ρ xt+1
k
− ρ zt+1
k
, ∀k.
7: until
(
||rprimal,t+1||2 ≤ γ1 and ||rdual,t+1||2 ≤ γ2
)
or t is too large.
8: Output: equilibrium allocation X∗ and equilibrium prices p∗.
Now we consider the privacy-preserving issue. It can be
observed that in Algorithm 1, the utility function of a service
is only known to that service. However, xt+1 is required for
the z-update step. A conventional approach to obtain xt+1
is to ask every the services to report xt+1i to the platform
and xt+1 = 1N
∑
i x
t+1
i . However, this approach reveals x
t+1
i ,
which is undesirable. For instance, by learning a sequence of
xi, which is the optimal resource bundle of service i given
the price signal p, an attacker (e.g., the platform or another
service) may be able to guess the utility function of service i.
A privacy-preserving protocol should not disclose any private
information of the services. If we can find a method to obtain
xt+1 without asking the exact value of xt+1i from every service
i, we can turn Algorithm 1 into a privacy-preserving distributed
algorithm. This procedure is executed right before the z-update
step and does not affect the properties (e.g., convergence rate)
of the ADMM-based distributed algorithm.
Conventional cryptographic techniques for average compu-
tation are quite sophisticated [23], [24], [28]. On the other
hands, differential privacy approaches do not produce the exact
average value [29]. Recently, [30] proposes a novel privacy-
preserving average consensus method. This method runs in an
iterative manner to find the average value, thus, may not be
suitable for our iterative optimization problem. Here, we intro-
duce a simple and efficient technique for privacy-preserving
average computation. Specifically, after the x-update step, each
service i holds a vector xi = (xi,1, . . . , xi,K). The iteration
index is removed for simplicity. We need to compute the
average vector x = (x1, . . . , xK) while keeping each vector
xi known to service i only. The proposed privacy-preserving
average computation algorithm works as follows. First, each
service i selects a random set Ni of ni other services. Then,
it generates a set of ni + 1 random numbers which includes
y0i and y
l
i, for all l ∈ Ni, such that sum of these numbers is
zero, i.e., y0i +
∑
l∈Ni
yli = 0, ∀i. Also, yli = 0, ∀l /∈ Ni.
Each service i keeps y0i and sends y
l
i to the corresponding
service l in Ni. To enhance security, the message containing yli
between service i and l can be encrypted to prevent attackers
from eavesdropping. In the next step, each service i waits to
receive all the messages from the other services who selected
i. If the message sent from service l to service i is encrypted,
service i has to decrypt the message using the shared key
between them to extract yil . Then, service i computes zi = xi+
y0i +
∑
l∈N y
i
l and sends the resulting vector zi to the platform.
Obviously, service i can also encrypt zi before sending it the
platform. It can be observed that
∑
i
zi =
∑
i
(
xi + y
0
i +
∑
l
yil
)
(39)
=
∑
i
xi +
∑
i
(
y0i +
∑
l∈Ni
yli +
∑
l/∈Ni
yli
)
=
∑
i
xi.
Thus, the platform can take the average of all the vectors
zi’s that it receives, which is precisely x. The steps above are
summarized in Algorithm 2, which allows us to find the exact
average vector x without disclosing xi. It is worth noting that
the generated noises yli, ∀i, l, cannot be reused. In other words,
we need to rerun the privacy-preserving average computation
algorithm at every iteration in Algorithm 1 to prevent an
attacker to learn xt+1i − xti , which is private information
of service i. In particular, if the attack can overhear zi
information, she can infer zt+1i − zti = (xt+1i + y0i +
∑
l y
i
l)−
(xti+y
0
i +
∑
l y
i
l) = x
t+1
i −xti. Finally, for the fully distributed
version of Algorithm 1 (i.e, without the platform), Algorithm
2 can be slightly modified by selecting a service to act as the
platform to compute x. Then, this service will broadcast the
x to the other services.
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Algorithm 2 is resistant to eavesdropping and collusion
attacks. Specifically, the private data of a service (e.g., ser-
vice i) might be exposed in two situations: i) attackers can
eavesdrop on the communication channels between this service
and some other services; ii) a group of services (may include
the platform) collude to infer xi. Indeed, the collusion case
is equivalent to the case where the communication channels
among service i and the collusive agents are eavesdropped. Let
Ii be the set of services that sends noise signals yil , ∀ l ∈ Ii,
to service i. Define Li = Ii ∪ Ni, ∀i, as the set of services
that communicate with service i.
Algorithm 2 PRIVACY-PRESERVING AVERAGING
1: Input: N services. Each service i keeps a vector xi = (xi,1, . . . , xi,K).
2: Step 1: each service i picks randomly a set Ni of ni other services.
3: Step 2: each service i locally generates ni+1 random numbers including
y0i and y
l
i, ∀l ∈ Ni, such that y
0
i +
∑
l∈Ni
yli = 0. For every service
l /∈ Ni, yli = 0. Also, service i keeps y
0
i for herself.
4: Step 3: each service i sends yli to service l ∈ Ni and does not send
anything to any service l /∈ Ni.
5: Step 4: after receiving all yi
l
from other services, service i computes
zi = xi + y0i +
∑
l∈N y
i
l
and sends zi to the platform.
6: Step 5: the platform computes x = 1
N
∑
i zi.
7: Output: The average vector x
Observe that zi is the only message of service i that contains
vector xi. However, even if an attacker can overhear and
decrypt this message to obtain zi, it is still difficult for her
to infer xi. To recover xi, the attacker needs to know y
0
i
and yil , ∀l ∈ Ii. Note that y0i depends on yli, ∀l ∈ Ni.
Thus, xi is revealed only if all the communication channels
between service i and the platform as well as the services
in Li are compromised. Define Pi as the probability that the
communication channel between service i and another service
(or the platform) is cracked. Let Qi(m) be the probability that
the number of services in set Li \ Ni is m. Then, given Pi,
the probability that xi is disclosed can be approximated by
Pni+1i
∑N
m=0Qi(m)P
m
i if the platform is not corrupt, and
by Pnii
∑N
m=0Qi(m)P
m
i if the platform is corrupt.
In summary, by embedding Algorithm 2 into Algorithm
1, we achieve a fully parallel and distributed privacy-
preserving algorithm. The additional step of running the
privacy-preserving averaging protocol (i.e., Algorithm 2) is
independent and does not affect the convergence property
of Algorithm 1, which follows directly the standard ADMM
algorithm. Obviously, the added privacy-preserving feature
comes at a cost, which is mainly the communication cost of
exchanging messages among the services in Algorithm 2. This
cost decreases as the size of set Ni decreases. For simplicity,
assume ni = |Ni| = b, ∀i. Then, the communication cost
of Algorithm 2 reduces significantly as b decreases. On the
other hands, the proposed algorithm becomes more robust as
b increases. Thus, there is a tradeoff between the robustness
of the privacy-preserving feature and the communication cost.
Depending on the specific system and design goal, the plat-
form can decide a suitable value of b to balance between the
privacy and communication overhead.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Simulation Setting
We generate data for a system that consists of 100 FNs
and 40 services (e.g., in a metropolitan area network). Each
FN is chosen randomly from the set of M4 and M5 Amazon
EC2 instances3. There are three types of resources (e.g., CPU,
RAM, and bandwidth) associated with each FN. For example,
an M4 Amazon EC2 machine of type m4.4xlarge has 16
vCPUs, 64 GiB of memory, and 2000 Mbps of bandwidth. It
is assumed that each service has the same base demand vector
at different FNs. The base demand vectors of different services
can be different. For each service, the amount of resource type
1 (vCPU), type 2 (RAM), and type 3 (bandwidth) in its base
demand vector are generated randomly in the ranges of [0.1,
0.5] vCPUs, [0.4, 2.0] GiB, and [10, 50] Mbps, respectively.
The maximum demand of every service is set to be 600
(i.e., maximum number of requests over a certain time period).
Hence, all the services have the same utility limit of 600 (i.e.,
umaxi = u
max = 600, ∀i). From the generated data, we can
normalize the resource capacity of the FNs and compute ai,j,r
accordingly, ∀i, j, r. By normalization, every resource type at
an FN has a capacity of one unit (i.e., Cj,r = 1, ∀j, r). Then,
note that one memory unit of FN 1 may correspond to 64 GiB
(e.g., FN 1 is an m4.4xlarge instance) while one memory unit
of FN 2 corresponds to 160 GiB (e.g., FN 2 is an m4.10xlarge
instance). Thus, one unit of the same resource type at different
FNs may have different values to a service.
For the sake of clarity in the figures and analysis, in the base
case, we consider a small system with 40 FNs and 8 services
(i.e., M = 40, N = 8), which are selected randomly from the
original set of 100 FNs and 40 services. Furthermore, it is
assumed that all the services have equal budget in the base case
(i.e., Bi = 1, ∀i). This default setting is used in most of the
simulations unless mentioned otherwise. It is worth noting that
the simulation served to illustrate our theoretical results only.
To reproduce our test cases and results, interested readers can
refer to our code using Matlab and CVX/MOSEK [45]. The
simulation was implemented on a Macbook Air 2017 1.8GHz
dual-core Intel Core i5 and 8GB of RAM. We utilize the
same seed (i.e., same dataset) to run the simulations. Our code
can be used to create arbitrary datasets/settings. We have run
the simulations using different datasets and observed similar
trends and conclusions for all the figures.
B. Numerical Results
We consider the following five allocation schemes.
• Generalized Eisenberg-Gale scheme (GEG): This is the
proposed scheme where the allocation is an optimal
solution to the generalized EG program (27)-(31).
• Eisenberg-Gale scheme (EG): In this scheme, the re-
source allocation is an optimal solution to (22)-(24).
• Proportional sharing scheme (PROP): Every buyer is
allocated a portion of every resource proportional to her
budget (i.e., buyer i receives Bi∑
i
Bi
of every resource).
• Social welfare maximization scheme (SWM) : In this
scheme, the platform determines an optimal allocation
that maximizes the total utility of all the buyers (i.e.,∑
i ui(xi)) subject to the resource capacity constraints
of the FNs. The budget constraint is not considered.
• Maxmin fairness scheme (MM): The system tries to max-
imize the utility of the buyer with the lowest utility (i.e.,
3https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/instance-types/
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max mini ui(xi)) under the FNs’ capacity constraints.
This scheme also ignores the budget constraint.
Note that GEG and EG are the two allocation schemes
studied in this paper. The others are considered as benchmark
schemes. In all the five schemes, the resulting utilities of the
buyers are truncated by their corresponding utility limits. From
Proposition 3.3 and Theorem 3.4, the solutions in both EG and
GEG schemes are market equilibria in our resource allocation
problem for buyers with utility limits. Obviously, if all the
buyers have infinite demands (i.e., umax = ∞), the solutions
produced by EG and GEG are the same.
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Fig. 2: Comparison between EG and GEG schemes
Fig. 2 compares the ME solutions in the EG and GEG
schemes. The bars labeled “No Limit” present the buyers’
utilities at the market equilibrium in our resource allocation
problem where buyers have no utility limits. Indeed, the
buyers’ utilities in the EG scheme are their utilities in the
“No Limit” setting truncated by the utility limits. We can
observe that when the utility limit is considered, the optimal
utilities in the GEG scheme tend to dominate those in the
EG scheme. This is because some buyers in the EG scheme
receive too many resources while they already reach their
utility limits (e.g., buyers 1, 6, and 7), which reduces the
resources available to other buyers. Since the GEG scheme
takes this issue into account by redistributing the wasteful
resources to other buyers, it outperforms the EG scheme. In
the EG scheme, if the redundant resources of buyers 1, 6, and
7 are reallocated to the other buyers, it can strictly improve
the utilities of some buyers. Thus, the ME produced by the
EG scheme is not Pareto-efficient. These results align with our
statements in Proposition 3.3.
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Fig. 3: Individual utility comparison
Figs. 3(a)–6(b) present the performance comparison among
the five schemes with and without the utility limit. We can
see that GEG balances well the tradeoffs between the system
efficiency and fairness. Specifically, Figs. 3(a)–3(b) show that
the utility of every buyer in GEG is always greater or equal to
that in the PROP scheme. Additionally, the total utility of all
the buyers in GEG is significantly higher than that in PROP
as illustrated in Figs. 4(a)–4(b). These observations imply the
sharing-incentive property of the proposed GEG scheme.
Although the SWM scheme gives high utilities for some
buyers, it may result in unfair allocations. For example, some
buyers have very low or even zero utilities as shown in
Figs. 3(a)–3(b). Finally, the MM scheme inherently generates a
fair allocation in terms of utility but it may lead to low system
efficiency. Also, MM may not be fair in terms of resource
quantity allocated to the buyers since some buyers receive too
many resources to compensate for their low marginal utilities.
In Fig. 4(b), the total utility of the buyers becomes saturated
as number of FNs increases. It is because when resources are
abundant, all the buyers can reach their utility limits.
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Fig. 4: Comparison of the total utility (N = 8)
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Fig. 5: Envy-freeness comparison (N = 8)
Figs. 5(a)–5(b) show the envy-freeness indices of the five
schemes. The envy-free index (EF) of an allocation X is [3]
EF (X) = min
i,i′
ui(xi)
ui
(
Bi
Bi′
xi′
) , ∀i, i′ ∈ N .
An allocationX is envy-free if EF (X) = 1. The higher EF is,
the better an allocation is in terms of envy-freeness. Obviously,
PROP is envy-free by definition. We can observe that both
EG and GEG are also envy-free, which confirms the envy-
freeness property of the proposed GEG scheme as theoretically
proved. These figures also reveal that both SWM and MM are
not envy-free. Noticeably, SWM may produce a very unfair
allocation (e.g., in Fig. 5(b), EF = 0 as M ≤ 40) when the
number of FNs is small (i.e., when the fog resource is scarce).
Similarly, given the same amount of fog resources, the EF
index of SWM decreases as the number of buyers increases.
This result is not shown here due to space limitation. Thus,
our proposed ME solution significantly outperforms SW and
MM schemes in terms of envy-free fairness.
Figs. 6(a)–6(b) illustrate the proportionality fairness prop-
erty of the proposed GEG scheme. In particular, PR of a
buyer is defined as the ratio between her actual utility and
her maximum possible utility by receiving all the resources
(i.e., PRi = ui(xi)/ui(C)). When there are eight buyers
(i.e., N = 8) with the same budget, an allocation satisfies the
proportionality property if the PR of every buyer is greater
or equal to Bi/
∑
i′ Bi′ = 1/8. Hence, these figures support
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Fig. 6: Proportionality property (N = 8)
our claim that the equilibrium allocation produced by GEG
satisfies the proportionality property.
In the following, we study the proposed GEG scheme
only. The impact of budget on the utilities of the buyers
is presented in Fig. 7 where we vary the budget B2 of
buyer 2 and fix the budgets of other buyers to be one (i.e.,
B1 = B3 = B4 = B5 = B6 = B7 = B8 = 1). It can
be seen that with and without considering the utility limit,
when we double the budget of buyer 2, her utility increases
significantly while the utilities of the other buyers tend to
decrease. Thus, the proposed scheme is effective in capturing
the service priority in making allocation decision.
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Fig. 7: Impact of budget on the equilibrium utilities
Figs. 8(a)–8(b) depict the utilization of different resource
types at several FNs. As we can see, the proposed scheme
produces an ME with high resource utilization. Additionally,
at least one resource type at every FN is fully utilized at the
equilibrium. Thus, the remaining resources cannot improve
the utility of any buyer and the allocation is efficient and
non-wasteful. Note that non-fully utilized resources have zero
prices at the equilibrium. Also, as the number of buyers N
increases, the resource utilization tends to increase.
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Fig. 8: Resource utilization (M = 40)
Finally, the convergence of Algorithm 1 is illustrated in
Figs. 9(a)-9(d) for different system sizes. Here, we set the
initial values of xi,k and zk to be
1
N as in the proportional
sharing scheme, and p1k = 1, ∀k. As we can see, the algorithm
converges to the optimal solution within a reasonable number
of iterations, which implies the effectiveness and practicality
of the proposed decentralized implementation. For instance,
for a system with 100 FNs and 20 services, it takes about 130
iterations for convergence (less than 1s for each iteration).
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Fig. 9: Convergence of the distributed algorithm
VI. RELATED WORK
FC and related concepts like EC and cloudlet have drawn
a lot of attention recently. In [31], A. Ceselli et al. present
a comprehensive mobile edge-cloud framework considering
various design factors including cloudlet placement, user mo-
bility, and service-level agreement. In [32], the authors jointly
optimize task image placement and task scheduling in a fog
network with dedicated storage and computing servers to
minimize the task completion time. By exploiting the Priced
Timed Petri Nets concept, [33] proposes a dynamic resource
allocation strategy that assists users to select suitable fog
resources from a group of pre-allocated resources. In [34], the
authors formulate a workload allocation problem in a hybrid
fog-cloud system, which aims to minimize the energy cost
under latency constraints. The online primal-dual approach is
employed in [35] to examine the edge resource crowdsouring
problem. Another major line of research considers the joint
allocation of communication and computational resources for
task offloading in wireless networks [2]. Different from the
existing literature, we study FC from the market design and
algorithmic game theory perspectives [5], with a specific focus
on pricing design and resource allocation in a multi-FN multi-
buyer environment.
Indeed, cloud resource allocation and pricing have been
studied extensively in the literature [7]. In [36], a dynamic
pricing scheme is introduced to maximize the cloud provider’s
revenue. The resource and profit sharing problem among
providers in a cloud federation is investigated in [37]. In [38],
the interaction between cloud providers and multiple services
is modeled as a generalized Nash game. Reference [39] formu-
lates the single-cloud multi-service resource provisioning and
pricing problem as a Stackelberg game that aims to maximize
the provider’s revenue while minimizing the services’ costs.
Additionally, various auction models have been proposed to
study cloud resource allocation [40]–[42] with the goal of
maximizing the social welfare or the cloud provider’s profit.
Typically, only winners in an auction receive resources. Also,
most of the existing auction models do not consider flexible
demands [41]. For instance, bidders are often assumed to be
single-minded, who are only interested in a specific bundle and
have zero value for other bundles. Unlike the existing works
13
on cloud economics and resource allocation, we examine a
market with multiple nodes and budget-constrained buyers.
This model captures practical aspects such as requests can
be served at different nodes and the buyers’ demands can
be defined flexibly. More importantly, the new ME solution
concept, which optimizes both the buyers’ utilities and the
resource utilization, is the salient feature of our work.
This work is also closely related to the MRA literature,
which has received considerable attention recently. The state-
of-the-art research on MRA for data centers is surveyed in
[17]. Noticeably, Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF) [19] is
the most prominent approach to MRA fairness in data centers.
In a nutshell, DRF is a generalization of max-min fairness
for multiple resources, which aims to maximize the minimum
dominant resource share across all the users. For the simplistic
setting where all resources are pooled together in a single
location and with some strong assumptions [19], DRF offers
many compelling properties. This approach has been extended
in the follow-up works [16], [20]–[22] to address more realistic
assumptions such as user demands are finite and resources
are distributed over multiple nodes. Both of these aspects are
captured in our work. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first comprehensive work that employs the Fisher market model
and competitive equilibrium to address the MRA problem in a
general setting with multiple nodes, each of which has multiple
resource types, and multiple users with finite demands. While
similar market-based approaches have been examined in [16],
[43], they consider simpler settings (e.g., a single resource
pool, a single resource type, and/or infinite demands).
Finally, although numerous distributed optimization tech-
niques [13], [14], [25]–[27] are available in the literature, most
of them require agents to exchange and reveal their estimates
explicitly to neighboring agents in every iteration to reach
consensus on the final optimal solution. We are among the
first to propose a privacy-preserving parallel and distributed
algorithm, which converges to the optimal solution without
asking the agents to reveal any private data. Unlike differential
privacy based methods [29] that add carefully-designed noises
to cover sensitive information and are subject to a trade-off
between privacy and accuracy, our proposed scheme enables
privacy preservation without sacrificing accuracy.
Another approach to enable data privacy is to employ
cryptographic techniques such as Garble Circuit (GC) [23]
and Fully Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [28], which are
often used in secure multi-party computation [24]. However,
HE is computationally expensive due to public key operations
and GC has expensive communication costs. Hence, these
cryptographic approaches are not suitable for distributed op-
timization which typically needs many iterations to converge.
Indeed, [44] is the only work that we are aware of studying
privacy-preserving decentralized optimization. Different from
their proposed algorithm that based on ADMM and partially
homomorphic cryptography, our construction of the privacy-
preserving part is non-cryptographic and simpler.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we introduced a new solution approach for al-
locating multiple resource types of different FNs to competing
services with diverse priorities and preferences. The proposed
solution produces a non-wasteful and frugal ME that makes
every service happy with the allocation decision while max-
imizing the resource utilization efficiency. Also, we showed
that the equilibrium has appealing fairness properties including
envy-freeness, sharing-incentive, and proportionality, which
encourages the services to engage in the proposed scheme.
Furthermore, a privacy-preserving distributed algorithm was
developed to compute the ME while obfuscating the private
information of the services, which significantly limits the
strategic capabilities of the market participants. The proposed
framework has potential to be applied in other settings such
as allocating virtual machines in data centers to cloud users
and allocating virtual network functions and middleboxes
to different network slices [6] (e.g., consider each network
function at a network node as a resource type and each slice
as a buyer).
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 3.1
The utility function ui(xi) of service i with unlimited
demand is given in (21). It is easy to verify the concavity
of ui(xi) by checking the definition of a concave function
[13]. Furthermore, for every α > 0, we have
ui(αxi) =
∑
j
min
r
αxi,j,r
ai,j,r
= α
∑
j
min
r
xi,j,r
ai,j,r
= αui(xi),
which confirms ui(xi) is homogeneous of degree one.
B. Proof of Theorem 3.4
Notice that the problem (27)-(31) always has an interior
feasible solution by simply setting xi,j,r positive and suffi-
ciently small, ∀i, j, r, so that all the constraints (29)-(31) are
satisfied with strict inequalities. Hence, Slaters condition holds
and the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions are necessary
and sufficient for optimality [13]. Define λi,j,r, µi, pj,r, and
γi,j,r as the dual variables associated with (28), (29), (30),
and (31), respectively. Consider the problem (27)-(31). The
Lagragian is
L
(X , u, λ, µ, p, γ) =∑
i
Bi ln
∑
j
ui,j
+
∑
i
µi
(
umaxi −
∑
j
ui,j
)
+
∑
j,r
pj,r
(
1−
∑
i
xi,j,r
)
+
∑
i,j,r
λi,j,r
(
xi,j,r − ui,jai,j,r
)
+
∑
i,j,r
xi,j,rγi,j,r. (40)
The KKT conditions of the problem (27)-(31) include
∂L
∂ui,j
=
Bi∑
j ui,j
−
∑
r
λi,j,rai,j,r − µi = 0, ∀i, j (41)
∂L
∂xi,j,r
= λi,j,r + γi,j,r − pj,r = 0, ∀i, j, r (42)
ui,jai,j,r = xi,j,r, ∀i, j, r; µi
(
umaxi −
∑
j
ui,j
)
= 0, ∀i (43)
pj,r
(
1−
∑
i
xi,j,r
)
= 0, ∀j, r; xi,j,rγi,j,r = 0, ∀i, j, r (44)
µi ≥ 0, ∀i; pj,r ≥ 0, ∀j, r; γi,j,r ≥ 0, ∀i, j, r. (45)
and primal feasibility conditions.
Since ui =
∑
j ui,j , from (41), we have
∀i, j : Bi
ui
−
∑
r
λi,j,rai,j,r − µi = 0. (46)
From (42), we have:
λi,j,r = pj,r − γi,j,r, ∀i, j, r. (47)
Since γi,j,r ≥ 0, ∀i, j, r, we have
∀i, j, r : λi,j,r ≤ pj,r. (48)
Also, from the second equality in (44), if xi,j,r > 0, then
γi,j,r = 0. Combined with (47), we have
∀i, j, r : if xi,j,r > 0⇒ λi,j,r = pj,r (49)
The first equality in (44) implies
∀j, r : if pj,r > 0⇒
∑
i
xi,j,r = 1 (50)
∀j, r : if
∑
i
xi,j,r < 1⇒ pj,r = 0 (51)
Finally, from the second equality in (43), we have
∀i : if µi > 0⇒ ui =
∑
j
ui,j = u
max
i . (52)
In summary, from the KKT conditions, we can infer
∀i, j : Bi
ui
−
∑
r
λi,j,rai,j,r − µi = 0 (53)
∀i, j, r : λi,j,r ≤ pj,r (54)
∀i, j, r : if xi,j,r > 0⇒ λi,j,r = pj,r (55)
∀j, r : pj,r
(∑
i
xi,j,r − 1
)
= 0 (56)
∀i : if µi > 0⇒ ui =
∑
j
ui,j = u
max
i . (57)
Indeed, (56) is exactly the market clearing condition. Also,
from (56), if pj,r > 0, then
∑
i xi,j,r = 1, ∀j, r, which
means all resources with positive prices are fully allocated.
Additionally, if
∑
i xi,j,r < 1, then pj,r = 0, ∀j, r, which
means all non-fully allocated resources have zero prices. From
(53)-(55) and the definition of qi,j in (26), we have:
∀i, j : qi,j =
∑
r
pj,rai,j,r ≥
∑
r
λi,j,rai,j,r =
Bi
ui
− µi (58)
∀i, j : if xi,j,r > 0⇒ qi,j =
∑
r
pj,rai,j,r =
Bi
ui
− µi. (59)
The inequality in (58) is due to (54). The last equality in (58)
is from (53). From (55), if service i buys resource type r at FN
j (i.e., xi,j,r > 0), then λi,j,r = pj,r, ∀i, j, r. Thus, from (55)
and (58), we can obtain (59). Denote qmini =
Bi
ui
−µi, ∀i. From
(58) and (59), we have qi,j ≥ qmini , ∀i, j, and if xi,j,r > 0,
then qi,j = q
min
i . Hence, the services buy resources only from
the cheapest FNs. Furthermore, from (53), we have:
Bi − µi ui =
(∑
r
λi,j,r ai,j,r
)
ui
=
∑
r
λi,j,r ai,j,r
∑
j
ui,j
=
∑
j
∑
r
λi,j,r
(
ai,j,r ui,j
)
=
∑
j
∑
r
λi,j,r xi,j,r
=
∑
j
∑
r
pj,r xi,j,r . (60)
The fourth equality in (60) is from the feasibility constraint
(28). The last equality in (60) is due to (55) and xi,j,r ≥
0, ∀i, j, r. Thus, from (60), we have:
µi ui = Bi −
∑
j
∑
r
pj,r xi,j,r , ∀i. (61)
Since
∑
j
∑
r pj,rxi,j,r is the total money spent by service
i for procuring fog resources, µiui can be inferred as the
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budget surplus of service i after purchasing the resources.
Consequently, if µi = 0, we have Bi =
∑
j
∑
r pj,rxi,j,r.
In other words, if µi = 0, service i spends all of its budget
to buy fog resources. Also, from (57), if µi > 0, then
ui = u
max
i . Hence, a service either spends all money at
the equilibrium or reaches its utility limit. Furthermore, we
showed that the services buy resources from the cheapest FNs
only. Additionally, from (61), the services do not overspend
since µi, ui ≥ 0, ∀i. Therefore, the optimal solution X to
the problem (27)-(31) maximizes the utility of every service
under the budget constraint.
We have shown that all the conditions of a non-wasteful
and frugal ME can be inferred from the KKT conditions of
(27)-(31). As a result, the optimal solutions to (27)-(31) are
indeed non-wasteful and frugal market equilibria.
Now, we show that the utilities are unique across all such
equilibria. Obviously, the problem (27)-(31) is equivalent to
maximize
X, u
∑
i
Bi lnui (62)
subject to ui =
∑
j
ui,j , ∀i; (28)− (31).
Since this problem has a strictly concave objective function,
it has a unique optimal utility vector u∗.
Finally, we show that any non-wasteful and frugal ME is
an optimal solution to the problem (27)-(31). Let (p,X) be a
non-wasteful and frugal ME in our resource allocation problem
with the service utility function given in (5). By definition, xi
is an optimal solution of the service maximization problem (9)-
(13) at the price vector p. We will show that X is an optimal
solution to the problem (27)-(31). Specifically, we prove that
X is feasible (i.e., satisfying (28)-(31)) and (p,X) satisfies
the KKT conditions (53)-(57).
Since the X is non-wasteful, it does not over-allocate
any fog resource, i.e.,
∑
i xi,j,r ≤ 1, ∀j, r. Also, from
(25), we have:
∑
j minr
xi,j,r
ai,j,r
≤ umaxi , ∀i. Because a non-
wasteful allocation allocates resources of an FN to a service
proportional to the service’s base demand vector, we have:
xi,j,r
ai,j,r
=
xi,j,r′
ai,j,r′
, ∀r, r′. Hence, we can define ui,j =
minr
xi,j,r
ai,j,r
=
xi,j,r
ai,j,r
, ∀i, j, r. Then, ∑j ui,j ≤ umaxi , ∀i.
Thus, X is a feasible solution to the problem (27)-(31).
Since the total money
∑
j
∑
r pj,rxi,j,r spent by service i
is constrained by its budget (i.e., constraint (12)), we have:
Bi ≥
∑
j
∑
r
pj,rxi,j,r =
∑
j
∑
r
pj,r
(
ai,j,r
xi,j,r
ai,j,r
)
(63)
=
∑
j
∑
r
pj,rai,j,rui,j =
∑
j
ui,j
(∑
r
pj,rai,j,r
)
.
Note that ui,j =
xi,j,r
ai,j,r
, ∀i, j, r. Also, the frugality condition
imposes: xi,j > 0 only if FN j satisfies
∑
r pj,rai,j,r = q
min
i .
If
∑
r pj,rai,j,r > q
min
i , then xi,j = 0 and ui,j = 0. Hence:
Bi ≥
∑
j
ui,j
(∑
r
pj,rai,j,r
)
=
∑
j
ui,jq
min
i = uiq
min
i . (64)
Let µi =
Bi
ui
− qmini . Then, µi ≥ 0, ∀i. Also, we have
qi,j =
∑
r pj,rxi,j,r ≥ qmini = Biui − µi, ∀i, j. Again, by the
frugality property, if xi,j,r > 0, then qi,j =
∑
r pj,rxi,j,r =
qmini =
Bi
ui
− µi. Hence, (58) and (59) hold. Consequently, by
properly setting λi,j,r, we obtain (53)-(55).
By Definition 2.1, prices p are non-negative. Also, if pj,r >
0, resource type r at FN j is fully allocated (i.e.,
∑
i xi,j,r =
1). Thus, (
∑
i xi,j,r − 1) pj,r = 0, ∀i, j, r, which is exactly
(56). The final step is to show (57).
Assume µi > 0. Then,
Bi
ui
− qmini = µi > 0. Hence
Bi > q
min
i ui = q
min
i
∑
j
ui,j =
∑
j
qi,jui,j (65)
=
∑
j
(∑
r
pi,j,rai,j,r
)
ui,j =
∑
j
∑
r
pi,jxi,j,r,
where the last equality is because ui,j =
xi,j,r
ai,j,r
, ∀i, j, r. The
second equality is from the frugality property of X , which im-
poses: ui,j = 0 if qi,j > q
min
i ; and ui,j > 0 only if qi,j = q
min
i .
Thus, if µi > 0, the total money spent by service i is strictly
less than its budget Bi. Define φi =
Bi∑
j
∑
r
qi,jxi,j,r
> 1.
We will prove (57) by contradiction. Assume ui =
∑
j ui,j <
umaxi . Since bundle (φixi) is affordable to service i, the service
can strictly improve its utility by purchasing bundle (φixi)
because, obviously, ui(φixi) > ui(xi). Thus, X does not
satisfy the service satisfaction condition, which contradicts to
the assumption that (p,X) is an ME. Therefore, if µi > 0,
then ui =
∑
j ui,j = u
max
i , ∀i, which is exactly (57).
C. Proof of Theorem 3.6
- Envy-freeness: To prove that the allocation X∗ is envy-
free, we need to show that ui(x
∗
i ) ≥ ui( BiBi′ x
∗
i′ ), ∀i, i′.
Since x∗i′ is the optimal resource bundle of service i
′ at the
equilibrium, service i′ can afford to buy bundle x∗i′ at prices
p∗. Hence, we have:
∑
j
∑
r p
∗
j,rx
∗
i′,j,r ≤ Bi′ . Thus:∑
j
∑
r
p∗j,r
( Bi
Bi′
x∗i′,j,r
)
≤ Bi, ∀i. (66)
Therefore, bundle
(
Bi
Bi′
x∗i′
)
is affordable to service i at
the equilibrium prices p∗. However, x∗i is the favorite bundle
of service i at the equilibrium. Hence, we have: ui(x
∗
i ) ≥
ui(
Bi
Bi′
x∗i′ ), ∀i, i′.
- Sharing-incentive: At the equilibrium, no service spends
more than its budget, i.e.,
∑
j
∑
r p
∗
j,rx
∗
i,j,r ≤ Bi, ∀i. Hence,∑
i
∑
j
∑
r
p∗j,rx
∗
i,j,r ≤
∑
i
Bi.
In other words, we have
∑
j
∑
r p
∗
j,r
∑
i x
∗
i,j,r ≤
∑
iBi. As
shown before, if
∑
i x
∗
i,j,r < 1, then p
∗
j,r = 0. Also, if p
∗
j,r >
0, then
∑
i x
∗
i,j,r = 1. Therefore, we have∑
j
∑
r
p∗j,r =
∑
j
∑
r
p∗j,r
∑
i
x∗i,j,r ≤
∑
i
Bi.
Consequently, the resource bundle xˆi costs service i:∑
j
∑
r
xˆi,j,rp
∗
j,r =
∑
j
∑
r
Bi∑
iBi
p∗j,r
=
Bi∑
iBi
∑
j
∑
r
p∗j,r ≤
Bi∑
iBi
∑
i
Bi = Bi, ∀i.
Therefore, service i can afford to buy bundle xˆi at prices p
∗.
However, given the set of affordable (i.e., feasible) resource
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bundles to service i, her favorite (i.e., utility-maximizing) one
is x∗i . Thus, ui(x
∗
i ) ≥ ui(xˆi), ∀i.
- Proportionality: By definition
Bi∑
i′ Bi′
ui(C) = Bi∑
i′ Bi′
min
{∑
j
min
r
1
ai,j,r
, umaxi
}
= min
{∑
j
min
r
Bi∑
i′
Bi′
ai,j,r
,
Bi∑
i′ Bi′
umaxi
}
.
From the sharing-incentive property, we have
ui(x
∗
i ) ≥ ui
( Bi∑
i′ Bi′
C)
= min
{∑
j
min
r
Bi∑
i′
Bi′
ai,j,r
, umaxi
}
≥ min
{∑
j
min
r
Bi∑
i′
Bi′
ai,j,r
,
Bi∑
i′ Bi′
umaxi
}
.
Hence, ui(x
∗
i ) ≥ Bi∑
i′
Bi′
ui(C). Consequently, the equilib-
rium allocation satisfies the proportionality property.
D. Derivation of Algorithm 1
The augmented Lagrangian of the problem (35)-(36) is
L(x, z, p) =
∑
i
fi(xi) + g(
∑
i
zi) + (67)
∑
i
(
pTi (xi − zi) + (ρ/2)||xi − zi||22
)
.
The ADMM updates are
xt+1i := argmin
xi
(
fi(xi) + (p
t
i)
Txi + (ρ/2)||xi − zti ||22
)
zt+1i := argmin
z
(
g(
∑
i
zi)−
∑
i
(pti)
T zi
+
∑
i
(ρ/2)||zi − xt+1i ||22
)
(68)
pt+1i := p
t
i + ρ(x
t+1
i − zt+1i ),
where t is the iteration index and z =
(
z1, z2, . . . , zN
)
. Define
wi = pi/ρ, which is called scaled dual variable, we have the
following scaled form of ADMM
xt+1i := argmin
xi
(
fi(xi) + (ρ/2)||xi − zti + wti ||22
)
zt+1i := argmin
z
(
g(
∑
i
zi)
+(ρ/2)
∑
i
||zi − xt+1i − wti ||22
)
wt+1i := w
t
i + x
t+1
i − zt+1i . (69)
It is easy to see that the update steps of xi and wi (or pi) can
be carried out independently in parallel for each user i.
We can further reduce the number of variables and also
simplify the update step of variable z as follows. Denote z =
(1/N)
∑
i zi. We have z ∈ RK . The z-update step in (69) can
be expressed as
minimize
z1,z2,...,zN
g(Nz) + (ρ/2)
∑
i
||zi − xt+1i − wti ||22
subject to z = (1/N)
∑
i
zi. (70)
For a given z, the optimal solution of problem (70) is
zi = x
t+1
i + w
t
i + z − (xt+1 + wt), ∀i. (71)
Hence, problem (70) can be rewritten as
minimize
z
g(Nz) + (ρ/2)
∑
i
||z − xt+1 − wt||22 (72)
From (69), we also have
wt+1i = w
t + xt+1 − zt+1, (73)
which implies that the scaled dual variables wi are all equal.
Denote w = wi, ∀i. The scaled form of ADDM becomes
xt+1i := argmin
xi
(
fi(xi)
+(ρ/2)||xi − xti + xt − zt + wt||22
)
zt+1 := argmin
z
(
g(Nz) + (Nρ/2)||z − xt+1 − wt||22
)
wt+1 := wt + xt+1 − zt+1. (74)
From the definition of fi(xi), we can write
xt+1i := argmin
xi
(
vi(xi) + (ρ/2)||xi − xti + xt − zt + wt||22
)
subject to xi ∈ Xi.
By replacing w with 1ρp, we obtain Algorithm 1.
E. Computational Complexity of the Centralized Solution
In the centralized solution, we need to solve the convex
program (27)-(31). Indeed, convex optimization problems can
be solved effectively by efficient techniques such as Interior
Point Methods [13]. For example, the optimality gap of the
solution computed by the barrier method, which is an Interior
Point Method, after k centering steps is smaller or equal to
m/(µkt(0)) where m is the number of inequality constraints
and µ and t(0) are constants (see [51] for more details about
convergence analysis, especially page 18 in the barrier method
lecture). In other words, to reach a desired accuracy level of ǫ,
it requires log(m/(t(0)ǫ))/logµ centering steps. Note that the
Newton’s method (see [13] or the Newton’s method lecture in
[51]) is used in each centering step.
Note that there exist many efficient convex optimization
solvers. In this work, we used CVX with MOSEK solver
option [45] to solve the formulated convex optimization prob-
lem. The computational time under different system sizes (all
with three resource types) is reported in Fig. 10. For each
system size, we run 10 simulations with different generated
data and take the average computational time. As we can
observe, the optimal solution can be computed quite efficiently.
For example, for a system with 200 buyers (N = 200) and
100 FNs (M = 100), it takes less than 4 seconds to obtain
the optimal solution. For moderate system sizes, the optimal
solution can be found in less than 1 second.
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Fig. 10: Computational time with varying system size
F. Example with Two Buyers and One Single-resource FN
In addition to the example presented in the paper (see
Fig. 2)), here we present a simple example with two buyers and
a single-resource FN (e.g., consider computing resource only)
to illustrate the wasteful equilibrium allocation phenomenon.
The example is summarized in Fig. 11. In particular, the
budgets of the buyers are B1 = B2 = 1. The utility limits
of the buyers are umax1 = 1 and u
max
2 = 10. Additionally,
a1 = 0.2 and a2 = 0.1 (i.e., one request of buyer/service 1
needs 0.2 unit of CPU). Hence, we have the utility functions:
u1(x1) = min
(x1
a1
, 1
)
= min
(
5× x1, 1
)
u2(x2) = min
(x2
a2
, 10
)
= min
(
10× x2, 10
)
The optimal solution to the problem (22)–(24) (i.e., the EG
scheme mentioned in the simulation) gives us the ME: p = 2,
x1 = x2 = 0.5, and u1 = 1, u2 = 5. At the equilibrium,
both buyers exhaust their budget since p × x1 = 1 = B1
and p × x2 = 1 = B2. Obviously, (p, x) where p = 2 and
x = (x1, x2) = (0.5, 0.5) is an ME to our model since both
buyers maximize their utility at the equilibrium price, the fog
resource is fully allocated to the buyers, and equilibrium price
is positive (i.e., p = 2). It is easy to observe that buyer 1
receives more resources than he needs (i.e., 5 × x1 = 2.5 >
1 = umax1 ). Thus, if we can reallocate the redundant resource
of buyer 1 to buyer 2, it will not affect the utility of buyer 1
while improving the utility of buyer 2.
For instance, the GEG scheme as mentioned in the sim-
ulation (i.e., the optimal solution to the problem (27)–(31))
results in a new ME as follows: p = 1.25, x = (x1, x2)
= (0.2, 0.8). This is obviously an ME since at the positive
price p = 1.25, the fog resource is fully allocated (i.e., market
clearing), and both buyers maximize their respective utilities
at the this price. At this new ME, the utilities of the buyers
become: u1 = 1 and u2 = 8, which are weakly better than
the utilities in the previous ME computed by the EG scheme.
There is no wasteful resources since 5× x1 = 1 = umax1 and
u2 = 8 < u
max
2 . It is also worth mentioning that buyer 1 has
a surplus budget of 1− 0.2× 1.25 = 0.75 at this new ME.
Note that there exist other ME in this example, which are
not the optimal solutions to both the problem (22)–(24) (i.e.,
the EG scheme) and (27)–(31) (i.e., the GEG scheme). For
instance, p = 1.6, x = (x1, x2) = (0.375, 0.625). Clearly, at
price p = 1.6, x2 = 0.625 maximizes the utility of buyer
2 subject to the budget constraint of this buyer. Also, at
this price, x1 maximizes the utility of buyer 1 and satisfies
his budget constraint. At the positive price p = 1.6, the fog
resource is fully allocated to the buyers (i.e., x1 + x2 = 1).
Therefore, (p, x) = (1.6, (0.375, 0.625)) is another ME in this
example. At this equilibrium, we have u1 = 1 and u2 = 6.75.
Buyer 2 fully spends his budget while buyer 1 has a budget
surplus of 1− 1.6× 0.325 = 0.48 at this equilibrium.
u2
max
 = 10, B2 = 1
 u2(x) = min(10x, u2max)
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Fig. 11: Toy example (one single-resource FN, two services)
G. Example with Two Buyers and Two Single-resource FNs
In the following, we present another toy example to show
the wasteful equilibrium allocation issue in Proposition 3.3.
Consider a market with two services and two single-resource
FNs. Obviously, the utilities of the services become linear
functions in the single-resource setting. Assume u1(x1) =
min
{
8 × x1,1 + 2 × x1,2, 1
}
, u2(x2) = 5 × x2,1 + 2 × x2,2,
B1 = 3, and B2 = 1. The optimal solution to the convex
program (22)-(24) gives all resource of FN1 to service 1 and
all resource of FN2 to service 2 (i.e., x1,1 = 1 and x2,2 = 1)
and the prices are p1 = 3 and p2 = 1. It is easy to verify
that this price vector and allocation form an ME. At the
equilibrium, u1 = 1 and u2 = 2. Since 8x1,1+2x1,2 = 8 > 1,
service 1 receives more resources than it needs. Consider
another ME where p = (p1, p2) = (0.7843, 0.3137), x1 =
(x1,1, x1,2) = (0.125, 0), x2 = (x2,1, x2,2) = (0.875, 1)
(i.e., we reallocate some redundant resources of service 1 in
the previous ME to service 2). At the new ME, u1 = 1
and u2 = 6.375. Obviously, this new equilibrium allocation
dominates the previous equilibrium allocation.
H. Discussion of Frugal Market Equilibria
Frugality is a natural and desirable property for any market
mechanism. Clearly, to obtain the same utility, a service prefers
to spend as least money as possible. For example, consider two
single-resource FNs with prices p1 = 10 and p2 = 1. Assume
that service A has the same utility for each FN (e.g., u1(x1) =
2×x1,1+2×x1,2). Obviously, given the prices, service A will
naturally buy resource of FN2 since it is cheaper. However, a
non-frugal ME may force service A to buy resource of FN1.
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In this case, service A has to spend more money to obtain the
same utility, which may make it unhappy.
Here we give a toy example of a non-frugal ME. The market
consists of two services and two single-resource FNs with the
same setting as in Appendix G. Beside the market equilibria
discussed in Appendix G, we consider the following price vec-
tor and allocation: p = (p1, p2) = (1, 2), x1 = (x1,1, x1,2) =
(0, 1), x2 = (x2,1, x2,2) = (1, 0), and u = (u1, u2) = (1, 5).
We can observe that service 1 obtains its optimal utility which
is equal to its utility limit of 1. Also, service 2 spends full
budget (x2,1p1 + x2,2p2 = 1 = B2) to buy resource of the
cheapest FN. Note that FN1 is the cheapest FN for service 2
since 5p1 >
2
p2
(i.e., utility gain over 1 unit of money spent).
Therefore, the price vector and allocation above form an ME.
However, this ME is not frugal since at the equilibrium,
service 1 receives full resource of FN2 while the cheapest FN
for service 1 is FN1 because 8p1 >
2
p2
. At this equilibrium,
service 1 spends x2,1p1 + x2,2p2 = 2. However, at prices
p = (1, 2), it is natural for service 1 to just buy 18 unit of
resource of FN1 to obtain its utility limit of 1. In this case,
service 1 needs to spend only 18 × p1 = 0.125, which is much
smaller than 2. Therefore, service 1 may not be happy with
this non-frugal ME.
I. Discussion of the Privacy Property in Market Design
In an FC market, or in any market in general, it is desirable
for market participants to keep their information private. For
instance, if the private data of an agent is revealed, other agents
can exploit it to gain benefits. To illustrate this issue, consider
an example with two services and two single-resource FNs.
The services have the same budget of one. The utility functions
of the services are u1(x1) = 4×x1,1+1×x1,2, and u2(x2) =
4× x2,1 + 4× x2,2, respectively. The GEG scheme produces
the following ME: p = (p1, p2) = (1, 1), x1 = (x1,1, x1,2) =
(1, 0), x2 = (x2,1, x2,2) = (0, 1), and u = (u1, u2) = (4, 4).
Now assume that service 2 knows the utility of service 1
and knows that service 1 prefers FN1 to FN2. Then, service
2 can pretend that its utility is u2(x2) = 4× x2,1 + 2× x2,2.
Consequently, the new ME computed by the GEG scheme is:
p = (p1, p2) = (4/3, 2/3), x1 = (x1,1, x1,2) = (0.75, 0), x2 =
(x2,1, x2,2) = (0.25, 1), and u = (u1, u2) = (3, 5). We can
see that u2 increases while u1 decreases. Service 1 receives
less resources because FN1 becomes more expensive. Indeed,
service 2 has many options to manipulate its utility to gain
benefit. For example, it can state its utility is u2(x2) =
12 × x2,1 + 4 × x2,2 (i.e., pretend to be more interested in
FN1). The new ME becomes: p = (p1, p2) = (1.5, 0.5), x1 =
(x1,1, x1,2) = (0.6666, 0), x2 = (x2,1, x2,2) = (0.3333, 1),
and u = (u1, u2) = (2.6666, 5.3333). This new ME sig-
nificantly increases the utility of service 2 while drastically
reducing the utility of service 1.
Therefore, preserving the privacy of the agents is an im-
portant and desirable feature of any market mechanism. It is
worth noting that the benefit that an agent can gain by playing
strategically in a Fisher market when he knows the private
information of the other agents has been studied in [49], [53],
[54].
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Fig. 12: Comparison between EG and GEG schemes
J. Statistical Simulation Results over Multiple Runs
For the ease of explanation, in the main paper, we randomly
generated the simulation data for one problem instance only.
To further demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed resource
allocation algorithm, for every experiment, we redo the sim-
ulation over 50 runs (i.e., 50 problem instances) to obtain the
statistical results including the mean values and/or boxplot
statistics.
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Fig. 13: Individual utility comparison (boxplot)
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Fig. 14: Comparison of the total utility (N = 8)
We can observe that the shapes of the figures and the
observations in the Performance Evaluation section remain
unchanged. For example, as can be seen from Figs. 12(a)–
12(b) (i.e., Fig. 2 in the main paper), the GEG scheme
outperforms the EG scheme. The boxplots in Figs. 13(a)–13(b)
(i.e., Figs. 3(a)–3(b) in the main paper) show that the GEG
and EG schemes are the same when we do not consider the
utility limit and the GEG scheme dominates the EG scheme
when the utility limit is considered. Furthermore, the utility
of every buyer in the PROP scheme is smaller or equal to
that in the GEG scheme, which implies the sharing-incentive
property of the proposed GEG scheme.
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Fig. 15: Envy-freeness comparison (N = 8, mean)
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Fig. 16: Envy-freeness comparison (N = 8, boxplot)
The MM scheme produces a fair allocation in terms of
utility at the cost of low system efficiency (i.e., total utility).
Figs. 14(a)–14(b) (i.e., Figs. 4(a)–4(b)) present total utility
comparison among the five schemes. Finally, we can observe
that the SWM scheme has the highest total utility and gives
high utilities for the buyers. However, it performs poorly
in terms of fairness. Figs. 13(a)–13(b) show that the utility
of each buyer varies significantly over 50 runs. Indeed, for
each problem instance, there always exist some buyers with
very low (even zero) utilities. Furthermore, 15(a)–16(c) (i.e.,
Figs. 5(a)–5(b)) show that SWM has bad envy-free index.
Similar to Figs. 6(a)–6(b) in the main paper, Figs. 17(a)–18(b)
indicate the proportionality of the proposed resource allocation
scheme.
The impact of the budget on the equilibrium utilities is
presented in Figs. 19(a)–19(b) (i.e., Fig. 7). We can observe
that when the budget of buyer 2 increases, his utility increases
significantly while the utilities of the other buyers tend to de-
crease. Hence, the proposed scheme can effectively capture the
service priority in the allocation decision. Finally, Figs. 20(a)–
20(d) (i.e., Figs 8(a)–8(b)) reveal that the proposed scheme
produces an ME with high resource utilization and the resource
utilization tends to increase as the number of buyers N in-
creases. It is worth mentioning that for each problem instance,
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Fig. 17: Proportionality property (N = 8, boxplot)
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Fig. 18: Proportionality property (N = 8, mean)
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Fig. 19: Impact of budget on the equilibrium utilities
each FN has one resource type that is fully utilized. However,
the fully-utilized resource type of an FN is not necessarily the
same for every run, which explains why the mean values of
resource utilization of all resource types of some FNs (e.g.,
FN5 in 20(a)) are less than 1.
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Fig. 20: Resource utilization (M = 40)
